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THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM AS A PUBLIC FORUM: THE 
INCOHERENCE OF PARTIES AS FREE SPEECH 
ASSOCIATIONS AND A PROPOSED CORRECTION
Wayne Batchis*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressing the associational rights of 
political parties is both highly consequential and deeply inconsistent. It dates back 
at least as far as the Court’s White Primary decisions more than a half-century 
ago. In recent decades, the Court has imposed an arguably ad hoc formula, 
striking down regulations on political parties on First Amendment grounds in 
some cases, while upholding them in others. From a jurisprudential perspective, 
critics might point to insufficiently principled distinctions between these cases. 
From a normative perspective, the very expansion of First Amendment rights to 
political parties, like the parallel extension to corporations in Citizens United, is 
ripe for scrutiny. It relies on a questionable underlying premise: political parties, 
as entities, should be entitled to constitutional rights comparable to those afforded 
to individuals. As a consequence, this Article argues entities the Framers would 
have viewed as dangerous factions are empowered, and individuals—the literal 
targets of the First Amendment’s protection—are disempowered. This Article offers
and explores a doctrinal alternative as a corrective: the American political party 
system should be treated as a limited public forum, subject to the Court’s well-
established public forum doctrine.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 438
I. WHY POLITICAL PARTIES ..................................................... 442
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO POLITICAL 
PARTIES................................................................................ 445
III. POLITICAL PARTIES AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH?................... 453
IV. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FREEDOM OF THE 
ASSOCIATION....................................................................... 456
V. A NEW PARADIGM: THE POLITICAL PARTY AS 
PUBLIC FORUM .................................................................... 465
VI. THE MECHANICS OF PUBLIC FORA ...................................... 468




438 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:2
INTRODUCTION
Categories matter in First Amendment jurisprudence. The free-
dom of speech and its derivative rights1 work as a remarkably pow-
erful immunity from ordinary law. Cabining and defining this im-
munity categorically serve to promote clarity and certainty that 
First Amendment freedoms will be there as a reliable shield even 
when deeply unpopular, and these refinements also provide the 
flexibility to give sufficient weight to non-expressive interests when 
appropriate. Categories can refer to discrete kinds of content 
deemed to receive less than full First Amendment protections, 
such as true threats, child pornography, and libel. Categories are 
also used to differentiate kinds of speakers—a government em-
ployee versus a private employee, an individual human being ver-
sus an associational entity comprising multiple human beings, the 
government versus a private corporation. Finally, categories are 
used to distinguish various platforms for expression, whether dif-
ferentiating a public forum, such as a public park, versus a private 
forum, such as the inside of a private home, or a privately-owned 
public place, such as a shopping mall versus a limited public forum 
controlled by government that serves a narrow constituency, such 
as a system for registering and funding student organizations at a 
public university. All of these First Amendment categories have 
critical constitutional implications. Yet, no category is hermetically 
sealed. Categories are powerful First Amendment tools, but they 
are often blurry on the edges. And when categories overlap with 
one another, when case law pertaining to a specific First Amend-
ment category is underdeveloped, when an inappropriate category 
is used, or when an appropriate categorization regime is ignored, 
courts may be forced to rely on ad hoc balancing rather than con-
sistent rules for resolving cases. While perhaps reasonable for the 
case at hand, such ad hoc decision making risks muddying the wa-
ters and degrading the overarching system of principled categori-
zation.
* J.D., Ph.D.; Professor, University of Delaware, Department of Political Science and 
International Relations.
1. This Article focuses primarily on the derivative right of freedom of association, but 
other rights derived from the free speech clause—though not textually guaranteed—might 
be said to include symbolic expression, financial expenditures or contributions utilized for 
expression, and litigation, among others. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372
(1927) (freedom of association); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(freedom of association); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (symbolic expression);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (financial expenditures); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1963) (litigation).
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This Article argues that political parties have yet to find a suita-
ble categorical home—and that such a home may be found in the 
limited public forum. Supreme Court decisions addressing politi-
cal parties have failed to settle on a coherent approach. In some 
contexts, parties have been treated as creatures of government,2
and in others as almost entirely private.3 At one time, the Court fo-
cused primarily on the equal protection implications of differential 
regulatory treatment of parties, but later it shifted its focus to a 
First Amendment analysis.4 Over time, the Court has seemed to set-
tle into the idea that political parties should be treated as expres-
sive associations for First Amendment purposes.5 But this approach
has garnered significant criticism and has had inconsistent and re-
grettable consequences.6 It is a doctrinal choice that has put courts 
in a role that they are not equipped to fulfill: parsing the merits of 
particular structural regulations governing the American electoral 
process and weighing these merits against the ostensible “associa-
tional” interests of the party.
By design, the Framers left us vast choice when it comes to de-
termining optimal electoral procedure. There are no easy answers. 
Policy choices over the fine-grained details of electoral procedure 
remain deeply contested by political scientists and theorists and are 
arguably not appropriate for judicial resolution. States may exper-
iment with different approaches: open or closed primaries, fusion
or single party candidates, caucus or primary. For every choice, 
there are consequences. I will not assert that such choices should 
be immune to the Constitution, only that the Court’s choice to 
categorize political parties as expressive associations was the wrong 
way to go about constitutionalizing political parties. In this Article, 
I propose an alternative First Amendment approach. The Ameri-
can political party system should be understood as a limited public 
forum. Public forum doctrine provides a better framework for con-
stitutionalizing the political party system. Viewing the system as a 
public forum acknowledges the extent to which parties are inextri-
2. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944); see also Terry v. Adams, 345 
U.S. 461, 481–84 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring) (stating that primary elections could be sub-
jected to the amendments to the Constitution as “part of the state’s electoral machinery”).
3. See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Tashjian v. 
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
4. JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 467 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skep-
tical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1993).
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cably integrated into the American system of representative gov-
ernment, while at the same time respecting the crucial traditional 
role they play in disseminating and facilitating vigorous free 
speech.
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence that ad-
dresses the associational rights of political parties is consequential, 
deeply inconsistent, and, to a wide range of scholars and jurists, 
troublingly flawed.7 It dates back at least as far as the Court’s White 
Primary decisions more than a half-century ago, which refused to 
respect the autonomy of racially exclusionary political parties in 
the American South.8 The cases were widely celebrated as a critical 
step in the civil rights struggle of African Americans. Less acknowl-
edged was their questionable underlying premise: that political 
parties, as entities, should be entitled to constitutional rights com-
parable to those afforded to individuals. The holdings purported 
to represent a simple concession, that associational constitutional 
rights must sometimes yield to other conflicting constitutional 
commands—here, equality—because for some purposes, a private 
political party takes on the role of a governmental actor.9 Over 
time, case-by-case challenges exposed fundamental tensions be-
tween individual rights and associational rights, and between pri-
vate party speech and government speech.
In recent decades, the Court has had many opportunities to im-
pose its concededly ad hoc formula10 for affording First Amend-
ment rights to political parties, striking down regulations on par-
ties in some cases, while upholding them in others. From a 
jurisprudential perspective, critics might point to insufficiently 
principled distinctions between many of these cases; to highlight 
just one example, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting 
independents from voting in major party primaries,11 but later up-
held a law prohibiting major party members from voting in third-
7. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, It’s My Party and I’ll Do What I Want To: Political Parties, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, and the Freedom of Association, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 65, 92–99 
(2013); Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
95 (2002); Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassess-
ment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 775–77 (2000); Lowenstein, supra note 
6, at 1741–42.
8. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
9. Terry, 345 U.S. at 481–84 (Clark, J., concurring); Smith, 321 U.S. at 663 (Black, J., 
plurality).
10. The Court has repeatedly explained that there is no “litmus-paper test” in this area 
of constitutional law. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 
(1997) (“No bright line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitu-
tional infringements on First Amendment freedoms.”).
11. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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party primaries.12 And from a normative perspective, there is much 
more to question than alleged inconsistency. The very expansion 
of First Amendment rights to political parties, like the parallel ex-
tension to corporations in Citizens United, is ripe for scrutiny. The 
result of this jurisprudence has been an electoral system that, while 
intended by the Framers to be guided by the states, is stymied by 
case law affording constitutional primacy to political parties. As a 
consequence, this Article argues, entities that the Framers would 
have viewed as dangerous factions are empowered, and individu-
als—the literal targets of the First Amendment’s protection—are 
disempowered. However, there are many reasons to doubt that po-
litical parties fit within this paradigm, even if one accepts the 
premise that associations should be treated as individuals for First 
Amendment purposes, which is a relevant principle in many areas 
of First Amendment jurisprudence. In a two-party system, political 
parties are simply not analogous to organizations such as the Boy 
Scouts, the Jaycees, or Citizens United, which are associations that 
have triggered the Court’s expressive association analysis. Indeed, 
this Article argues that viewing them as such is inconsistent with 
another emerging First Amendment principle: the government 
speech doctrine.
The American party system is a hybrid. As an essentially public 
institution serving America’s democratic process, the government 
should have ample room to regulate and structure the party system 
to serve the general welfare, as well as to ensure that representative 
democracy works and works well. At the same time, it would ignore 
reality to deny that political parties have a significant private com-
ponent that is analogous, in some respects, to the private individu-
als who fill public parks and utilize them for their own non-
government-affiliated speech. Governmental regulatory power over 
parties thus must also face significant First Amendment bounda-
ries—limits that would not apply if political parties were character-
ized as purely governmental entities. A doctrinal middle ground, in 
other words, is needed. The public forum doctrine, as this Article
shows, strikes just such a balance. Although this doctrine may have 
begun as a narrow instrument addressing a small subset of gov-
ernment-controlled geographic spaces, the concept of the limited
public forum has evolved to encompass a broad range of expressive 
venues. These include intangible venues—such as a system of regis-
12. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
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tered student organizations at a state university13—that are striking-
ly analogous to the American two-party system. The limited public 
forum framework is an excellent fit for the hybrid nature of the po-
litical party system.
This Article begins by briefly considering why we have the politi-
cal party system that we do in America. Next, it examines the histo-
ry of the Supreme Court’s evolving political party jurisprudence, 
which is followed by an analysis and critique of two possible doctri-
nal roads the Court might have, and in some cases did, traverse—
the notion that when parties speak it is, in fact, the government 
speaking, and, in contrast, the view that political parties should be 
treated as private, rights-bearing associational entities largely inde-
pendent of the state. This Article then introduces and defends a
new middle-ground paradigm: the American political party system 
should instead be understood as a public forum for First Amend-
ment purposes. This is followed by an exploration of how political
parties might fit within the existing public forum doctrinal frame-
work. The Article concludes that the political party system should 
be categorized as a limited public forum.
I. WHY POLITICAL PARTIES
America’s Framers established a framework for a republican sys-
tem of government in which ideally wise representatives would be 
chosen—often indirectly—by the people. Famously, however, they 
left out many of the details. Political parties are not mentioned in 
the Constitution, and there is, in fact, much evidence that the 
Framers held them in low esteem.14 To America’s Founding Fa-
thers, parties were vehicles for self-interest that inhibited the pro-
motion of the common good.15 George Washington, in his 1796 
Farewell Address, spoke of the “baneful effects of the spirit of par-
ty,” emphasizing that the
“spirit of party . . . enfeeble[s] public administration . . . ag-
itates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false 
alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another; 
foments occasional riot and insurrection[; and] opens the 
13. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 680–85 (2010).
14. L. SANDY MAISEL & MARK D. BREWER, PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA: THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS 9, 22 (Niels Aaboe et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).
15. GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 4, at 450–51.
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door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a fa-
cilitated access to the government itself through the chan-
nels of party passion.”16
Even with the early success of the Jeffersonian-Republican Party in 
beating back the Federalists, both Jefferson and Madison hoped 
that eventually their own party’s influence would dissipate, “restor-
ing the nonpartisan character of the Constitution.”17 Nevertheless, 
Madison viewed political parties as “unavoidable evils in a free so-
ciety, forces to be condemned, yet patiently endured.”18
Today, Americans take the two-party system for granted. Howev-
er, suppose we momentarily forget those attributes of the political 
process that have emerged and evolved over more than two centu-
ries since the ratification of the United States Constitution. With 
the Framers’ minimal blueprint in mind, what choices might we 
make? How should we fill in the unanswered details? How should 
we go about choosing representatives? With staggering diversity, a 
vast range of interests and perspectives, and perhaps most trou-
blingly, a tendency by much of the population to be only superfi-
cially engaged in the policy debates and personal assessments in-
volved in making such choices,19 answering these questions might 
appear daunting.
Suppose we choose a political party system as the primary meth-
od of organizing this overwhelming task. Considering the chal-
lenge, this may make intuitive sense. Admittedly, a system in which 
two dominant and fiercely competitive teams take a central role—
consolidating ideology, personality and organization—may prove 
imperfect. However, there is much to be said for such a system. 
The parties provide heuristics to voters, an important and practical 
shortcut for deciding which candidates to support.20 With only two 
major parties, there is bound to be quite a lot of diversity within 
each party; at the same time, they are also likely to be broadly dis-
tinguishable on ideological grounds.21 Thus the implications of a 
candidate’s party affiliation become comprehensible to even the 
16. George Washington, President of the United States, Farewell Address to the People 
of the United States (Sept. 19, 1796) in S. DOC. NO. 106-21, at 16–17 (2000).
17. SIDNEY M. MILKIS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT:
REMAKING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 22 (Michael Nelson ed., 1999).
18. GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 4, at 451.
19. CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS 9-12 (2017).
20. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow 
the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV.
331, 349–50 (1997).
21. GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 4, at 459–60.
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relatively disengaged citizen. Parties provide a centralized organi-
zational structure to represent and advocate for this massive amal-
gamation of ideas, positions, and personalities. The parties help 
voters narrow down the list of candidates from which they choose.
This function helps ensure that the set of choices voters confront is 
not too long and that voters do not simply disengage from the 
democratic process because it is intolerably overwhelming. At the 
same time, in representing such a broad swath of the population, 
political parties must remain responsive to the world around them. 
According to Professor Richard Hasen, “as an encompassing coali-
tion, [a party] is able to accommodate a large number of diverse 
groups and viewpoints, giving each group a stake in the outcome 
of the election.”22 They are stable, yet flexible and changeable.
Thus, if we were to accept the principle that a two-party system 
would be an effective way to structure a representative democracy, 
the next natural question is: How would this work? How are parties 
to function? To what extent should they be incorporated into the 
very operations of government, including in presidential elections, 
in Congress, and in America’s vast bureaucracy? How are they to 
choose their standard bearers? How are they to be structured to 
best achieve their ends—which, ultimately, are the ends of our 
democracy itself—of a vital government that is sustainable, effi-
cient, reflective of the people it represents yet sufficiently respect-
ful of their diversity, and perpetually open to debate, reinvention, 
discovery, and improvement.
The reality of political parties is, or course, not hypothetical. We 
have lived with a system in which two political parties are an inte-
gral part—if not the integral part—of America’s democratic process 
for more than 150 years.23 Yet, we still have trouble identifying just 
what political parties are. Political parties are confounding. They 
affect the government, are the government, and are controlled by the 
government, and all of these attributes are true in different ways 
and, to a varying extent, at different times. Political scientists have 
long agreed that political parties are in fact best understood not as 
one thing at all, but at least three things: an organization made up 
of activists and leaders, a group of elected and appointed officials 
22. Hasen, supra note 20, at 347.
23. Scholars generally trace the emergence of the modern two-party system to the Jack-
sonian era of the 1830s. See, e.g., MILKIS, supra note 17, at 22–34. To explain the continued 
durability of the two-party system in the United States, political scientists point to the preva-
lence of winner-take-all representation. This may be contrasted with the proportional repre-
sentation that results in multiparty systems in many other parts of the world. See GARDNER &
CHARLES, supra note 4, at 31.
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who form parts of the government and act under the party banner, 
and individual citizens and voters who affiliate with the party.24 Par-
ties are fluid and rigid, combative and conciliatory, diverse but uni-
fied. They are ubiquitous, yet hard to know. In short, it can be dif-
ficult to wrap one’s head around the nature of the political party.
It thus may be tempting to simplify the American political party, 
to seek to boil it down to its essence. And one might imagine this 
essence to be a simple group of people who band together to have 
their voices heard and advocate for a particular set of policies for 
the greater (or self-serving) good. With this conception in mind, it 
might make intuitive sense to afford such groups the negative 
rights—the freedoms from government interference—provided to 
individuals by the Constitution. But this definition, while appealing 
in its simplicity, will not do. This is not to say that it does not have 
its proponents. However, the institutional enormity, organizational 
complexity, and multiplicity of roles that the two parties play in 
American society make such a reductive definition profoundly un-
satisfying or, at best, staggeringly insufficient. Furthermore, under 
this conceptualization, the questions above about how we should 
structure a two-party system potentially become moot, because they 
are not our (meaning our government’s) questions to answer. 
Thus, on one hand, a romanticized vision of political parties may 
emphasize their private nature, portraying them as civic-minded 
organizations made up of average Americans simply seeking to 
have a political voice. On the other hand, the two-party system is 
quite reasonably understood as an essential building block of our 
electoral and democratic structure, one that should be self-
consciously utilized, designed, and redesigned to make American 
democracy work as well as it can. In many respects, these concep-
tualizations are in direct tension with one another.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO POLITICAL PARTIES
The Supreme Court has struggled mightily to determine how 
political parties should be treated from a constitutional perspec-
tive, but it initially took the position that they were private entities 
beyond the control of the federal government. In the 1921 case 
Newberry v. United States, a Senate candidate seeking his party’s
24. MARJORIE RANDON HERSHEY, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 8 (Eric Stano et al. eds., 
14th ed. 2011); see also GARDNER & CHARLES, supra note 4, at 459.
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nomination had exceeded the amount of primary campaign 
spending allowed under federal law.25 Article I, Section 4 of the 
Constitution gives the federal government authority to “make or 
alter such [r]egulations” with regard to the “[t]imes, [p]laces and 
[m]anner of holding [e]lections” for members of Congress.26
However, when confronted with the question in Newberry of wheth-
er such power extends to the regulation of party primaries, the Su-
preme Court said it did not.27 One might characterize Justice 
McReynolds’s opinion as a simple exercise in originalism. Since 
political party primaries were “unknown” at the time the original 
constitutional was drafted, McReynolds reasoned that the power to 
regulate primaries should not be understood to be part of the gov-
ernment’s power.28 He then went on to adopt the conception of 
party behavior that recalls the simple (or arguably simplistic) mod-
el discussed above, describing party primaries as “merely methods 
by which party adherents agree upon candidates whom they intend 
to offer and support.”29 Parties, in other words, are just voluntary 
organizations, and primaries are events in which those people, of 
their own free will, simply get together and choose someone to 
best represent and act upon their views. Allowing the government 
to interfere with the internal processes of private political parties 
would “infringe upon liberties reserved to the people.”30 Despite 
the crucial role political parties play in Article I, Section 4 elec-
tions, the majority in Newberry chose formalism over realism: “If it 
be practically true that under present conditions a designated par-
ty candidate is necessary for an election—a preliminary thereto—
nevertheless his selection is in no real sense part of the manner of 
holding the election.”31 After all, the Court reasoned, “[m]any 
things are prerequisites to elections.”32
The Court itself was not unified in its reasoning. In concur-
rence, Justice Pitney sharply questioned the logic of excluding 
primaries from the government’s constitutional power to regulate 
elections when they have “no reason for existence, no function to 
perform, except as a preparation for the [general election]; and 
the latter has been found by experience in many States impossible 
25. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 244–46 (1921).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, §4, cl. 1.
27. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 233–34.
28. Id. at 250.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 258.
31. Id. at 257.
32. Id.
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of orderly and successful accomplishment without the former.”33
Pitney questioned, “[w]hy should ‘the manner of holding elec-
tions’ be so narrowly construed? An election is the choosing of a 
person by vote to fill a public office. In the nature of things it is a 
complex process, involving some examination of the qualifications 
of those from whom the choice is to be made.”34 In other words, 
there was reason to doubt the durability of the Court’s extremely 
formalistic perspective. We might note that this was the same Court 
that would repeatedly deny the federal government regulatory au-
thority through the Commerce Clause under the rationale that 
manufacturing and mining may result in commerce but are not 
themselves commerce.35 The Newberry Court drew on the logic of 
this now-discredited line of cases as analogous support for rejecting 
regulatory authority over political party primaries.36 As with the 
Court’s restrictive Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it would not 
take long for the Court’s perspective to change. But, unfortunately,
as this Article demonstrates, change would not mean clarity on the
constitutional status of political parties.
In United States v. Classic, the Court did away with the formalistic 
rule in Newberry and concluded that the federal government’s crim-
inal laws may be used to ensure that voters in primary elections 
have their votes counted. Classic involved the illegal alteration and 
falsification of ballots in a party primary, and, once again, the ques-
tion was whether the power granted to regulate elections by Article 
I, Section 4 of the Constitution extended to this issue.37 In this 
1941 opinion, Justice Stone unequivocally rejected not merely the 
formalism of Newberry, but its originalism as well. To Stone, it was 
largely irrelevant that those drafting Section 4 did not contemplate 
party primaries, “[f]or in setting up an enduring framework of 
government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future 
and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those 
fundamental purposes which the instrument itself discloses.”38
Stone pointed out the perverse implications of reading the Consti-
tution to allow for the regulation of a general election, but not the 
33. Id. at 282.
34. Id. at 279.
35. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
36. Newberry, 256 U.S. at 257 (“Without agriculture, manufacture, mining, etc., com-
merce could not exist, but this fact does not suffice to subject them to control of Con-
gress.”).
37. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 307 (1941).
38. Id. at 316.
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primary leading up to that election, when the latter election simply 
ratifies the decision of primary voters.39 Indeed, it is quite common 
in areas of the country where a single party is dominant for a gen-
eral election to feel like, and effectively be, a mere formality.40 In 
such jurisdictions, the winner of the dominant party primary is vir-
tually guaranteed victory in the general election. In such a context, 
denying Congress the authority to regulate a party primary is argu-
ably tantamount to a wholesale denial of its Article I, Section 4 
power, because the true electoral contest—the one that matters—is 
the primary.
At this stage, the Court was contemplating the simple question 
of whether the federal government’s constitutional power over 
elections is broad enough to encompass party primaries. Concern 
over party autonomy, in which the party itself is a rights-bearing ac-
tor, had not yet entered the picture. The Classic Court pointed out 
that the party primaries at issue were conducted at state expense 
and in accordance with state regulations dictating “the time, place 
and manner” of the elections.41 The Court reasoned that, effective-
ly, the state had simply turned what the Framers might have imag-
ined as a one-step process (a general election) into one with two-
steps (a primary, followed by a general election).42 The party pri-
mary had thus become a part of “an election” within the meaning 
of Article I, Section 4.
However, from this point, the complexities only grow. It is one 
thing to conclude that the federal government has the power to 
regulate a certain activity, which provides the baseline conclusion 
that such activity is within the government’s ambit of power. The 
next question is how the party and its activities are characterized 
for other constitutional purposes. The intuitive understanding of a 
political party may be that of a voluntary association of individuals 
who seek to promote a particular set of interests or views. Classic 
would suggest that even if this characterization is accurate, where 
the primary process of that party becomes a part of the overall 
election process, the federal government nonetheless has the pow-
er to regulate such party primaries. In itself, there is nothing espe-
cially controversial or surprising about the general proposition that 
the government has the power to regulate private behavior. The 
39. Id. at 319–20.
40. Increasing Turnout in Determinative Primaries, PLURIBUS PROJECT,
http://pluribusproject.org/representation/echelon-insights (last visited January 8, 2019).
41. Classic, 313 U.S. at 311.
42. Id. at 316–17.
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question in Classic might simply be understood as whether the fed-
eral government has the power to regulate this particular private 
behavior.
It is also, however, private behavior that is intimately intertwined 
with government behavior. Once upon a time, major parties may 
have begun as largely voluntary associations, but the premise of 
Stone’s majority opinion in Classic is that they now function as an 
essential part—if not the essential part—of a state-run democratic 
election. Not only might this justify governmental regulation of 
party activity, but party activity might in some sense be said to be-
come state activity. And when the state is the actor at issue, the rules 
change. Regulation of the action may move from optional-statutory 
to mandatory-constitutional. It might seem like quite a leap for 
governmental regulation of political parties to move from imper-
missible, to permissible, to required, all on the basis of how one 
characterizes that entity and its actions. However, this is the natural 
consequence of two foundational aspects of the American constitu-
tional system: the limited government principle of federalism and 
the state action doctrine. As explained in Classic, to be merely per-
missible, a federal government regulation must be within the ambit 
of the government’s constitutional power,43 and, as this Article
shall discuss, it may not be disallowed by negative constitutional 
rights such as those found in the First Amendment. To be a required
regulation—in the case of a mandatory substantive constitutional 
constraint—the party must be said to be engaging in state action.
As much as the principles embodied in the Constitution may re-
flect values that are aspirational for all of society, whether it be to 
freely exchange ideas, respect certain aspects of individual privacy, 
or ensure equal treatment, constitutional commands are generally 
directed at only governmental actors. The Constitution, after all, is 
strong medicine. The Constitution not only carved out rights or 
guarantees thought to be important or valuable, but it was de-
signed such that its meaning could not be changed without a su-
permajority through the amendment process or through a rare 
shift in Court sentiment. This seemingly undemocratic choice was 
justified by the need to place affirmative limits on a uniquely pow-
erful institution, an institution unlike any other. The government, 
as the Framers understood, monopolizes legitimate violence and 
poses distinctive and dangerous risks of abuse. The state action 
doctrine has thus long suggested that private actors and entities 
43. Id. at 320.
450 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:2
are quite simply not subject to the rigid mandates that the Consti-
tution imposes on the government. For undesirable behavior by 
non-governmental actors, the use of statutory law offers a more 
flexible remedy.
This was the issue in the White Primary Cases. Smith v. Allwright
was decided just three years after Classic. The Texas Democratic 
Party invited only white Texans to participate in its primary elec-
tions. The Party argued that the Constitution did not speak to 
the—albeit racist—associational choices of a private, voluntary or-
ganization. The Party could exclude those with whom it chose not 
to associate.44 There was no question that if the state had injected 
such exclusionary race-based distinctions directly into its election 
laws, it would have been struck down as an unconstitutional state 
action in violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.45
Indeed, the Court did precisely this in the 1927 case Nixon v. Hern-
don, where the state of Texas explicitly stipulated that Black people 
were ineligible to vote in Democratic primaries.46 Likewise, five 
years later in Nixon v. Condon, when Texas returned with a revised 
law giving the parties a general power to “prescribe the qualifica-
tions of its own members” and the Texas Democratic Party, in turn, 
adopted its own resolution limiting primary participation to “white 
democrats,” the Court struck down that law as unconstitutional.47
Because the authority for the discriminatory voting policy “origi-
nat[ed] in the mandate of the law,” the lines between public and 
private action were blurred; the Court once again saw state action 
in the discriminatory policy, not the mere actions of an independ-
ent voluntary organization.48
However, by the time the Court confronted Smith v. Allwright in 
1944, it had seemed to have backtracked, or at a minimum, to have 
declared that there were real limits to the principles emanating 
from the cases that imputed state action to political parties. In 
Grovey v. Townshend, a Black Texan was denied an absentee ballot 
for a Democratic primary election on the basis of his race. The 
Court declined to strike down the racist policy on constitutional 
grounds, distinguishing the case from Condon by emphasizing that 
here, the method of voting was decided at an independent party 
44. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 657 (1944).
45. The Fifteenth Amendment reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
46. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
47. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
48. Id. at 84.
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convention rather than by an executive committee designated by 
Texas law.49 In Smith, the Court overruled Grovey.50 Instead of fol-
lowing Grovey, it adopted a broad definition of state action, which 
included a party’s decision to exclude members on the basis of 
their race.51 The choice to discriminate may have been the party’s, 
decided at a party convention, but the procedures for party prima-
ries were subject to an extensive architecture of state regulation.52
The Smith Court reasoned that the “statutory system for the selec-
tion of party nominees for inclusion on the general election ballot 
make the party which is required to follow these legislative direc-
tions an agency of the state in so far as it determines the partici-
pants in a primary election.”53
On its face, this logic appears quite unassailable. As the Court 
points out, ruling otherwise would establish a very convenient 
loophole for governments that seek to deprive individuals of fun-
damental constitutional guarantees: Simply cast one’s “electoral 
process in a form which permits a private organization to practice 
racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would be 
of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.”54 The chal-
lenge, however, is identifying the boundaries of this principle. To
be effective, government policy must be responsive to the world,
regardless of whether governmental actors have the goal of sub-
verting or promoting constitutional goals such as equality. It is 
quite natural for law to go beyond merely adapting to a changing 
social reality and to incorporate changed reality into new laws to 
effectuate its ends. Social institutions, such as political parties and 
other interest groups, may arise organically and voluntarily, with-
out involvement of the government. They may expand and develop 
a life of their own. Government, however, responds. A changed so-
cial landscape necessitates greater governmental involvement if it is 
to merely continue fulfilling the mission that it had prior to such 
evolutions; in the case of the expanding and changing role of po-
litical parties, this means maintaining an optimal system of fair, 
democratic, and representative elections. Granted, what is “opti-
mal” is very much a matter of debate. However, it is clear that a 
government that is required to be entirely passive because of the 
49. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 54 (1935).
50. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
51. Id. at 663–64.
52. See id. at 663.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 664.
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“private” nature of political parties would grow troublingly impo-
tent in fulfilling its basic constitutional responsibilities.
This principle reached what could perhaps be said to be its zen-
ith almost a decade later in Terry v. Adams, when the Court struck 
down on constitutional grounds the exclusionary practices of what 
appeared to be a purely private organization. A whites-only organi-
zation that ran its own Democratic pre-primary elections was thor-
oughly independent of government regulation by design. In fact, 
the Jaybird Association of Fort Bend County Texas denied that it 
was a political party at all, insisting that it was a mere “self-
governing voluntary club.”55 With this intention to be distinct from 
state action, it held its primary in May, before it would have quali-
fied for regulation under Texas law and been required to allow 
participation by all races.56 The informal but consistent impact of 
this unofficial, association-controlled pre-primary process, which 
was not state-sanctioned, was that the Jaybird Association-endorsed 
candidate went on to claim victory in every Democratic primary for 
countywide office for more than a half century.57 The Jaybird-
endorsed candidates filed for the subsequent Democratic primary, 
which they invariably won with complete independence; the fact 
that they were the Jaybird endorsee was transmitted to the public 
only through private means.58 As Justice Minton acerbically pointed 
out in his dissent, the “record will be searched in vain for one iota 
of state action sufficient to support an anemic inference that the 
Jaybird Association is in any way associated with or forms a part of 
or cooperates in any manner with the Democratic Party of the 
County or State, or with the State.”59
Minton, however, was a lonely voice. He was the only dissenter 
on a Court that now rejected formalism in favor of a realistic 
acknowledgement of how private action could be used to circum-
vent, co-opt, and effectively nullify state action, at least in the polit-
ical party context. The Court reasoned that “[t]he Democratic 
primary and the general election have become no more than the 
perfunctory ratifiers of the choice that has already been made in 
Jaybird elections from which Negroes have been excluded.”60 The 
Jaybirds was a political party, even if it failed to identify itself as 
55. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463 (1953).
56. Id. at 464.
57. Id. at 472.
58. Id. at 471.
59. Id. at 485–86 (Minton, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 469 (majority opinion).
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one, and its primaries had “become an integral part, indeed the 
only effective part, of the elective process.”61 As such, constitutional 
principles applied to its actions. The broader implications of the 
ruling for the status of political parties were potentially profound. 
If an organization, which does everything within its power to ap-
pear to maintain its independence and avoid political party status, 
is nonetheless branded a state actor, it would seem clear that the 
Court’s test is one of function over form. Political parties are state 
actors, and it is not because of the label, but because of their state-
like function.
III. POLITICAL PARTIES AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH?
If political parties are to be treated as instrumentalities of the 
state, the constitutional implications would not appear to be lim-
ited to negative restraints on party behavior flowing from the state 
action doctrine. If a political party is effectively a governmental ac-
tor, then, in other important respects, the Constitution would not
apply. Specifically, the Constitution does not generally protect the 
government from itself. So, while the government may not conduct 
a search without probable cause, it may be as unreasonable as it 
sees fit when it is searching its own property. Although it may not 
have the power to deprive individuals of their right to keep and 
bear arms, it may choose to dramatically reduce its own arma-
ments. In other words, if political parties are government, govern-
ment regulation cannot be said to infringe on their rights. In the 
sphere of free expression, this has become known as the Govern-
ment Speech Doctrine. The government may generally choose to 
speak, not to speak, or to convey only select messages and not oth-
ers, without infringing on the First Amendment.62
Admittedly, the government speech doctrine is a relatively new 
one or, at least, newly articulated. Scholars have acknowledged that 
it is a doctrine that “remains in transition,” one in which there is 
still a significant lack of clarity.63 Nonetheless, in recent cases, the 
Supreme Court has made significant strides toward intelligibility. 
As Helen Norton explains, this solved a longstanding problem.64
Lower courts simply did not have the doctrinal vocabulary to deal 
61. Id.
62. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
63. Helen Norton, Government Speech in Transition, 57 S.D. L. REV. 421, 426 (2012).
64. Id. at 421–22.
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with free speech claims challenging expressive choices by govern-
ment. Surprisingly, it was not until the middle of the last decade 
that the Court clearly acknowledged the seemingly commonsense 
notion that “[n]ot only must the government speak if it is to gov-
ern, its speech is often quite valuable to the public.”65 In 2009, the 
Supreme Court confronted a challenge by a relatively obscure reli-
gious group that sought to place a permanent monument in a pub-
lic park. Although another monument of the Ten Commandments 
had been previously accepted and installed by the city, the Court 
was clear that the private group had no First Amendment claim to 
require the city to accept the display.66 The Court reasoned that 
the choice to install an expressive work of art in a city park is gov-
ernment speech.67 Succinctly asserting what has come to be known 
as the government speech doctrine, Justice Alito explained that 
“[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of pri-
vate speech; it does not regulate government speech.”68
As discussed above, Smith and Terry suggest that political parties 
are, at least in certain respects, to be treated as state actors due to 
their government-like electoral functions. Thus, taking the logic of 
these cases one step further, one might conclude that not only may 
governmental bodies freely regulate political parties, they may do 
so in a manner that, if imposed on private parties, would violate 
the Constitution. But this cannot be right. Under this logic, Wa-
tergate would not have been a scandal at all. Search and seizure of 
the Democratic National Headquarters by operatives of a Republi-
can president would have merely evidenced the government 
searching its own offices—if a crime at all, it would not have consti-
tuted a constitutional infringement. Why does this not sit well? Be-
cause, of course, while the political parties in America may in many 
respects play roles that are integral to the functioning of the gov-
ernment, they are vehicles for competing visions of the social 
good. They are in perpetual tension not only with each other, but 
with their own members and potential supporters who seek to alter 
or strengthen aspects of their official and unofficial platform. It 
would be difficult to accept the notion that when one of the two 
major political parties controls the government, the other major
party may also, at the same time, be considered “the government.”
It might be tantalizingly attractive for a Democratic president to 
65. Id. at 421.
66. Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
67. Id. at 464.
68. Id. at 467.
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sign an executive order demanding that the Republican National 
Committee refrain from any expressive activity challenging the 
wisdom of his administration’s policy objectives and calling this 
choice not to speak “government speech.” However, this would 
seem, for obvious reasons, profoundly antithetical to the robust 
debate that is part and parcel of our democratic system. It is per-
haps equally dubious—and alarming—to imagine a president cen-
soring the expression of that segment of his own party that is criti-
cal of his choices.
Political scientists have long understood the inherent complexity 
of political parties. They are many things at once: the party organi-
zation, including the “party leaders and the activists who work for 
party causes and candidates;” the party in government, comprised 
of those who hold office under the party banner; and the party in 
the electorate, citizens who affiliate with the party.69 Should the 
party organization, which might make rules that effectively deprive 
individuals of their ability to participate in the democratic process, 
receive the same constitutional status as a group of party-affiliated 
citizens who come together to discuss and formulate their ideas, as 
in the White Primaries? How about a party operative who is ap-
pointed to a government commission and must, by law, be a mem-
ber of one or the other major political party? We need not only ask 
whether the government may constitutionally regulate a political 
party, but whether one part of a party may silence or regulate an-
other part of the same party.
A constitutional middle ground between political parties as gov-
ernment actors and political parties as purely private associations 
appears to be necessary. Over many years of seemingly inconsistent 
decisions on the status of political parties, one could argue that 
this is ultimately what the Court has delivered. There are many 
good reasons, as seen in the White Primary Cases, to hold political 
parties accountable for constitutional violations as if they were state 
actors. These are instances in which government regulation of a 
party appears effectively indistinguishable from a government’s
regulation of itself and it should be treated that way for constitu-
tional purposes. Yet, there are other circumstances where a degree 
of autonomy is essential if a party is going to fulfill its core demo-
cratic functions, both as a vessel of ideas and a forum for the con-
testation of ideas. This need for autonomy might seem to call out 
for constitutional protection for the party itself. Just what doctrinal 
69. HERSHEY, supra note 24, at 8.
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rule will adequately account for the complex, confounding, sui gen-
eris nature of political parties in America? What form should this 
middle ground take? Thus far, the in-between constitutional status 
for political parties has been achieved through a diverse array of 
decisions, each responsive to the facts at hand, but cumulatively 
lacking in coherence.70
Many would agree that constitutional principles should not be 
applied ad hoc. Yet, political parties and their activities intersect 
with the Constitution in a variety of possible ways. As difficult as the 
task may be, courts should ideally strive to devise a set of doctrinal 
rules that is responsive to the complex and changeable nature of 
political parties in America, yet also provides a needed degree of 
clarity and predictability. The remainder of this Article will focus 
on, critique, and offer a suggestion to correct one choice made by 
the Court: the decision to treat political parties as rights-bearing 
entities under the First Amendment’s freedom of association. 
IV. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FREEDOM OF THE ASSOCIATION
The command that “Congress make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech”71 has been interpreted to mean much more 
than an assurance that literal “speech” will not be restrained by the 
government. The Supreme Court has gradually come to 
acknowledge that an individual’s ability to form groups and to as-
sociate with others has a close relationship with their ability to 
form and express ideas, thus concluding that this right is likewise 
deserving of First Amendment protection.72 Over time, however, 
the association has itself morphed into a First Amendment rights-
bearing entity.73 Critics point out that this doctrinal transformation 
quietly occurred with distressingly little attention to potential in-
ternal dissention and the complex individual dynamics that exist 
within an organization.74 As an implied right derived from the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech, the freedom of the association 
70. See discussion infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
72. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (implicitly accepting, for the first 
time, the view that “association” is to be included alongside the textual First Amendment 
protections of “speech” and “assembly”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958) (firmly and explicitly establishing that freedom of association is protected by the 
First Amendment).
73. See Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of 
Association to Freedom of the Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5 (2012).
74. See id. at 18–25.
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has had a significant impact on the structure of electoral contests 
in America, but it is troublingly under-theorized. The Supreme 
Court’s Citizens United decision, in which the freedom of speech, by 
way of financial expenditures, was guaranteed to corporate entities,
brought to the fore the inherent challenges and contradictions in-
volved in affording expressive rights to collective bodies.75 Howev-
er, largely missing from the vigorous debate over the concept of 
“corporate speech” has been a line of decisions affording a similar 
set of guarantees to another category of collective body: political 
parties.
Early decisions on political parties made allusions to the need 
for party autonomy and independence. In 1931, Justice Cardozo 
referred to “the exercise of inherent powers of the party by the act 
of its proper officers.”76 Yet, he seemed to acknowledge that such 
inherent powers were often the product of statutory law. There was 
no mention of an inherent constitutional right. In 1934, the Texas
Supreme Court argued that, in reference to the Democratic Party, 
“[w]ithout the privilege of determining the policy of a political as-
sociation and its membership, the right to organize such an associ-
ation would be a mere mockery.”77 The court relied primarily on 
the Texas Constitution for direct support, but it also referred tan-
gentially to the First Amendment. However, in Smith v. Allwright,
the U.S. Supreme Court cited and rejected the Texas Supreme 
Court’s reasoning; the Court mentioned only the state court’s reli-
ance on the Texas State Constitution, not an implicit freedom of 
association ostensibly emanating from the First Amendment.78 Jus-
tice Clark’s four-justice concurrence in Terry, while agreeing that 
the Jaybird Association was subject to the Fifteenth Amendment’s
dictates, provided a caveat: “Not every private club, association or 
league organized to influence public candidacies or political action 
must conform to the Constitution’s restrictions on political par-
ties.”79 Seemingly acknowledging the flip-side of the equation, 
Clark suggested that “[c]ertainly a large area of freedom permits 
peaceable assembly and concerted private action for political pur-
poses to be exercised separately by white and colored citizens 
75. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
76. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 86 (1932).
77. Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 546 (Tex. 1934).
78. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 654–57 (1944).
79. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 482 (1953).
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alike.”80 Yet there was no explicit mention of a political party’s First 
Amendment freedom of association.
By the 1970s, however, the Court would begin to make the legal 
source of political party autonomy increasingly clear, and this 
source was to be found in the Constitution: While political parties 
were seemingly state actors in certain contexts, as demonstrated by 
the White Primary Cases, they were simultaneously entitled to pro-
tection as independent entities under the implicit associational 
rights of the First Amendment. Two steps were required to reach 
this conclusion. First, freedom of speech is interpreted to include 
an individual’s ability to join with others. Second, any government 
regulation of that association is seen as an infringement on that 
individual’s associational rights to join the association of their 
choice, since such regulation will, to some extent, alter the nature 
of that association.
The first step is a principle that dates back at least as far as 1927, 
when the Court in Whitney v. California—although rejecting the de-
fendant’s claim of First Amendment protection—implicitly accept-
ed that an individual’s right to associate with others is included in 
the bundle of First Amendment rights, even though the word “as-
sociation” is nowhere to be found in the amendment.81 By the late 
1950s, the Court would explicitly strike down a law that interfered 
with an individual’s right to associate.82 The context of NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson was case-specific: a civil rights era decision 
addressing an Alabama law that required public disclosure of the 
state membership lists, including the NAACP, an organization at 
the center of the civil rights storm.83 It was a requirement that po-
tentially put the safety of the members and their families in jeop-
ardy, establishing a powerful deterrent to associate with the organ-
ization.84 Nevertheless, the 1958 decision was a narrow one. 
Although Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court articulated for the 
first time how the freedom to associate relates to an individual’s
right of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment, the opin-
ion was narrowly tailored to address the unique facts at hand.85 In-
deed, First Amendment scholar John Inazu observed that there was 
significant internal discord among the members of the Court as to 
80. Id.
81. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
82. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
83. Id. at 451–54.
84. Id. at 462.
85. Id. at 460.
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whether and to what extent the decision should be doctrinally 
rooted in the First Amendment at all.86 Over time, however, this 
freedom of association expanded to apply to a wide range of con-
texts. By the 1970s, the freedom to join together with a major polit-
ical party of one’s choice, previously a right without a committed 
constitutional home, would be explicitly grounded in the implicit 
freedom of association in the First Amendment.87
The second step toward broad First Amendment-based autono-
my for political parties, however, required adding another link to 
the proverbial logic chain of expressive freedom—a chain that 
seemed to be getting further and further in proximity from the 
explicit free speech guarantee laid out in the First Amendment. 
That is, to the extent that the association or political party is regu-
lated at all by the government, the individual’s right to join with 
that group may be said to be hindered, as the law might require the 
group to alter its fundamental nature. In the 1975 decision Cousins 
v. Wigoda, which addressed a conflict between a state’s election 
laws and a national party’s rules for seating delegates to its national 
convention, the Court was unequivocal: “The National Democratic 
Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of 
political association.”88 It then went on to argue that “[any] inter-
ference with the freedom of the party is simultaneously an inter-
ference with the freedom of its adherents.”89
To the extent that political parties are the state, this principle is 
oxymoronic. If they are creatures of the state, political parties are 
products of law. Law thus could not be said to interfere with an en-
tity that would not exist but for the law. Admittedly, as discussed 
above, earlier decisions such as the White Primary Cases have not 
gone as far as to conclude that political party action is always state 
action. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental tension between, on 
one hand, the conclusion that parties are to be treated for some 
purposes as state actors subject to constitutional constraints and, 
on the other hand, private associations that are entitled to consti-
tutional protection from government.
It is possible to critique the assertion in Cousins that any regula-
tion that impinges on the structural or procedural choices of a po-
litical party necessarily detracts from the freedom of individual 
86. John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L.
REV. 485, 514–16 (2010).
87. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 487–88 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
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members. As discussed previously, political parties are multifaceted 
organizations with a multiplicity of roles and inherent—but varia-
ble—internecine tensions. As Michael Kang argues, they “are di-
verse aggregations of political actors that variously work together 
and oppose one another across and inside party lines . . . .
[I]ndividual leaders come together for common goals but at the 
same time compete vigorously with one another for relative influ-
ence within the party coalition.”90 Some may see regulations as “an
interference” with the party, but others may find that they bolster 
the “freedom of adherents” by establishing procedures that, for 
example, reduce the influence of the smoke-filled room, boost 
transparency, or ensure a greater role for rank-and-file members of 
the party. In other words, there is no reason to assume that the 
rules imposed by party insiders will result in greater expressive 
freedom than laws imposed by state legislatures intended to im-
prove upon the democratic process.
Yet, by constitutionalizing the political party as an expressive as-
sociation entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court tilted 
the scales with precisely this assumption, and, at the same time,
gave itself a profound new role as the arbiter of quality election 
policy. It is a role that the Court is arguably ill-equipped to fill. Af-
ter Cousins, it was the Court’s job to assess the merits, both practi-
cal and theoretical, of regulatory attempts to improve upon or 
manage America’s two-party system. The majority in Cousins adopt-
ed a relatively high bar for determining whether a particular gov-
ernmental “interference” with a political party is to pass constitu-
tional muster. In the Court’s view, the state government failed to 
demonstrate that “protecting the integrity of its electoral process”
constituted a compelling interest for enforcing election laws that 
would trump the party’s determination of which delegates should 
be seated at its national convention.91 After Cousins, it is up to the 
Court to make a case-by-case, determination of whether particular 
election laws affecting political parties are sufficiently “compelling”
to be constitutionally justified.
This Cousins principle would prove to be enduring. Six years lat-
er, in Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
the Court once again struck down a state law that conflicted with a 
national party’s convention rules.92 This time, the law required that 
90. Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics of Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 
134 (2005).
91. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491.
92. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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the state’s delegates to the national convention be bound to the 
candidate who was victorious in the state’s open primary.93 This se-
lection through an open primary process—in other words, one 
that was open to non-party voters—violated the Democratic Party’s
rules.94 The party argued that allowing non-party participation 
would dilute the voting strength of members of the Democratic 
Party.95 The Court devoted a good deal of the opinion to outlining 
the reasons for such a rule, even citing political science literature 
that supported the national party’s decision to institute it.96 The 
state had its own reasons for its law, specifically “preserving the 
overall integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the 
ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing 
harassment of voters.”97 The Court was not convinced that the 
State’s argument was a compelling one. It concluded that “the in-
terests advanced by the State do not justify its substantial intrusion 
into the associational freedom of members of the National Party.”98
The Court declared the law to be an unconstitutional intrusion in-
to associational freedom.99
Ironically, after arriving at its holding by immersing itself in the 
pros and cons of Wisconsin’s rule, the majority waved the flag of 
judicial modesty, professing that it was “not for the courts to medi-
ate the merits of this dispute.”100 How could it make such a claim 
when its opinion seemed to do precisely that, by weighing the re-
spective substantive arguments of the Party and the State and then 
deciding which perspective was more convincing? The only palata-
ble response is that the Court was now applying a presumption of 
unconstitutionality to regulations on parties. In other words, the 
default was now that “a State, or a court, may not constitutionally 
substitute its own judgment for that of the Party.”101 This dramatic 
assertion was a far cry from the middle-ground approach it seemed 
to take in earlier cases, which acknowledged political parties as 
quasi-state actors. Indeed, the Court backed away quite dramatical-
ly from prior decisions in which it readily admitted the sometimes 
almost-inseparable relationship between party primaries and the 
93. Id. at 111–12.
94. Id. at 110–12.
95. Id. at 116–17.
96. Id. at 118–20.
97. Id. at 124–25.
98. Id. at 125–26.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 123.
101. Id. at 123–24.
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electoral process. In a sharply worded footnote, the Court rejected 
the State’s claim of authority over the electoral process under Arti-
cle II, Section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides that 
the state is to determine how electors for president are to be cho-
sen. Devoid of the nuance in Classic and the White Primary Cas-
es,102 the Court asserted that “[a]ny connection between the pro-
cess of selecting electors and the means by which political party 
members in a State associate to elect delegates to party nominating 
conventions is so remote and tenuous as to be wholly without con-
stitutional significance.”103
Three dissenters took a similar approach, thus willingly balanc-
ing the associational interests of the party against state electoral 
policy interests on a case-by-case basis, but they came to a very dif-
ferent conclusion. The dissenters examined Wisconsin’s law in 
light of the State’s longstanding goal to “enlarge citizen participa-
tion in the political process and to remove from the political bosses 
the process of selecting candidates”104 and acknowledged how the 
open primary, by eliminating “potential pressures from political 
organizations on voters to affiliate” serves this end.105 The dissent 
went on to weigh the lack of evidence that party raiding—the risk 
that a party’s opponent will abuse the open primary system to vote 
for the opposition party’s candidate thought to be the weakest—is 
a problem in Wisconsin.106 In engaging in these debates with a 
fined toothed comb and constitutionalizing their conclusions, the 
Court had clearly jumped head first into the political thicket.
There are strong arguments that the Supreme Court’s freedom 
of association jurisprudence, broadly construed, is deeply prob-
lematic.107 The Founders framed the First Amendment in human 
terms. What began as an individual First Amendment right to join 
with a group for expressive purposes, which was derived from that 
individual’s explicit right to speak in the First Amendment, over 
time became a right possessed by the association itself. If this asso-
ciation is a legal entity, contradictions and tensions between the 
individual’s expressive freedom and the association’s purported 
freedom become increasingly apparent. Justice Scalia, who was in 
the majority in the controversial Citizens United decision that af-
102. See, e.g., id. at 134 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) (acknowledging this nuance).
103. Id. at 125 n.31 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 135 (Powell, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 136 n.13.
106. Id. at 136 n.12.
107. See Batchis, supra note 73.
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forded corporations (a kind of association) a free speech right to 
spend unlimited sums on political “speech,” has acknowledged 
“that when the Framers ‘constitutionalized the right to free speech 
in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Amer-
icans that they had in mind.’”108 Scalia’s justification for expanding 
this right beyond the individual was the seemingly intuitive as-
sumption that an “individual person’s right to speak, includes the 
right to speak in association with other individual persons.”109 However, 
individual speech and associational speech are fundamentally dif-
ferent and often irreconcilable.
As a collective, each association has its own distinctive procedure 
and method for determining who gets to do “the speaking” for the 
association and what is to be said. Some associations may be highly 
democratic and make majoritarian decisions, and some may use 
ownership share as a metric for determining influence. Others may 
rely on strong leaders and backroom deals to determine the con-
tent of official associational speech. Large numbers of association 
members may disagree vehemently with many of the speech choic-
es made by the powers that be within the association. Attaching a 
constitutional status to such “speech” has the perverse effect of en-
dowing an idiosyncratic internal structure, responsible for churn-
ing out authorized associational speech, with the blessing and pro-
tection of the highest law in the land. At the same time, it 
potentially sidelines the individuals who were the intended benefi-
ciaries of the First Amendment.110
Such concerns are particularly germane to political parties. As 
mentioned earlier, the very extent to which political parties are in-
dependent non-governmental associations is itself questionable. As 
Elizabeth Garrett explains, “[t]he major parties make up govern-
ment and provide a structure to mediate among citizens, interest 
groups, and government officials.”111 However, the critique of the 
characterization of political parties as rights-bearing associations
runs much deeper than this. The very nature of party membership 
is up for debate. The two major political parties are vast and di-
verse organizations that have each recently comprised around
twenty-five to forty percent of the American voting population.112
108. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 391 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 392.
110. See Batchis, supra note 73, at 35–39.
111. Garrett, supra note 7, at 111.
112. See Party Affiliation, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-
affiliation.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
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While it is common to think of party membership as constituting 
those registered with a particular party, members may instead be 
defined as all voters for a party’s candidate (whether registered or 
not), party leaders, party activists, officeholders, office seekers, in-
terest groups, or all of the above. Garrett argues that 
the ease in which courts and others refer to political parties 
as “membership organizations” masks the difficulties in-
volved in figuring out whether there are any individuals or 
groups that are properly characterized as “members” in the 
usual sense of that word. Political parties are aggregations 
of many kinds of interests, some individual and many col-
lective.113
In short, there are compelling reasons to doubt that the major 
parties should be treated as one speaker with one voice for First 
Amendment purposes because they represent such enormous 
swaths of the American electorate and are comprised of individuals 
and groups with an almost unfathomable range of interests, atti-
tudes, experiences, and perspectives.
Nevertheless, over the three and a half decades following Demo-
cratic Party v. Wisconsin, the Court would maintain a case-by-case 
approach to the freedom of association of political parties. The 
cumulative results are messy and incoherent, with members of the 
Court readily admitting that balancing the “two vital interests” of 
associational freedom and “fair and effective” participation “does 
not lend itself to bright-line rules but requires careful inquiry into 
the extent to which the one or the other interest is inordinately 
impaired under the facts of the particular case.”114 As explored in 
later sections of this Article, a majority of the Court has broken in 
different directions in different cases. At times, it has struck down 
regulations on political parties as unacceptably intrusive into their 
associational rights—for example, invalidating laws that prohibit 
party endorsements in primaries,115 laws that do not allow inde-
pendents to vote in a party’s primaries against that party’s wishes,116
and laws mandating a blanket primary.117 At other times, it has up-
held laws regulating political parties—for example, a law institut-
113. Garrett, supra note 7, at 109.
114. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 234 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
115. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 214–16 (1989).
116. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210–11.
117. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
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ing a top-two primary in which the top two candidates, regardless 
of party, confront each other in the general election118 and a law 
establishing semi-closed primaries, which preclude parties from 
opening their primaries to members of other parties.119 In all of 
these cases, there were strong dissents by justices whose ad hoc 
balance would have resulted in a different outcome, belying any 
optimism that consistent and predicable principles might ultimate-
ly emerge from this body of jurisprudence. Numerous scholars 
have roundly criticized the Court for its approach and inconsisten-
cy on political parties.120
V. A NEW PARADIGM: THE POLITICAL PARTY AS PUBLIC FORUM
What if political parties were not treated as rights bearing enti-
ties at all? Pioneering election law scholar Daniel Lowenstein has 
argued that accepting the theory that political parties are entitled 
to associational rights was an “unwelcome step” by the Supreme 
Court.121 To Lowenstein, “the major parties constitute the govern-
ment, and when constitutional challenges are presented in the 
name of these parties, the parties are complaining about some-
thing they have done to themselves.”122 These words, however, were 
written in 1993, well before the government speech doctrine was 
articulated by the Court. As alluded to earlier, the prospect of 
treating parties as government, as well as the subsequent application 
of the government speech doctrine, would be intolerable. The 
temptation by the party in power to systematically rid the parties of 
all inter- or intraparty dissent would be unlimited, effectively kill-
ing one of the most critical functions of parties as vehicle for de-
bate. Yet, we might readily agree with Lowenstein that the “conven-
tional First Amendment framework simply does not fit the major 
political parties, their relationship with the government that they 
structure, or the claims pressed in the name of their freedom of as-
sociation.”123
I propose, however, that there is an alternative available, a doc-
trine that provides a surprisingly good fit for the peculiar institu-
118. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 458–59 (2008).
119. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 598 (2005).
120. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 7, at 92–100; Garrett, supra note 7, at 95–96; Persily & 
Cain, supra note 7, at, 775–79; Lowenstein, supra note 6, at, 1741–43.
121. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1742.
122. Id. at 1758.
123. Id. at 1791.
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tion that is the political party. Ever since Justice Owen Roberts, in 
1939, penned his famous dictum in Hague v. CIO, the public forum 
doctrine has come to stand for the idea that government is not lim-
ited to one of two roles, of speaker or speech regulator. In some 
contexts, government must act as a speech facilitator. Why? Because 
government monopolizes the public realm. Thus, on one hand, 
the Court has come to acknowledge that a big part of governing 
involves government speech by selectively choosing which ideas to 
convey and promote. On the other hand, it involves maintaining a 
public sphere in which free expression must be unimpeded with-
out selective interference. The quintessential example is the public 
park. Streets and parks, Justice Roberts famously explained, 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes 
of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and 
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and 
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the 
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.124
This perspective represented a dramatic jurisprudential shift 
from what had effectively been a “government speech” approach—
well before this conceptualization became an identifiable doctrinal 
category. Prior to Hague, the government was treated like any pri-
vate deed holder, with complete power to allow or disallow particu-
lar speech on its property, regardless of the public nature of the 
space.125
The public forum doctrine, however, rejected this broad, unre-
strained conception of governmental power in which the First 
Amendment would present no obstacle to government censorship 
in critical settings where the public traditionally has made its voice 
heard. In the years following Hague, the idea of the public forum—
venues that are constitutionally protected for broad and diverse 
expressive freedom yet simultaneously government controlled—
would expand well-beyond the public park. The public forum cat-
egory would grow to apply to more than just property-based venues 
for expression. Thus, an interschool mail system that is open to the 
public might be considered to be a public forum,126 as well as a 
school district’s properties that are made available outside of 
124. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
125. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
126. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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school hours for social and civic uses,127 and even a student organi-
zation fund at a public law school.128
It is important to note that the Court has never required com-
plete immunity from regulation simply by virtue of identifying a 
venue as a public forum. Far from it. As we shall see, the Court has 
drawn categorical distinctions between different types of public fo-
ra and afforded them differing levels of constitutional immunity. 
Roberts himself acknowledged in Hague that even in a quintessen-
tial public forum, expressive rights are “not absolute.”129 They may 
be “regulated” but not “abridged or denied.”130 It does not require 
great mental acuity to understand why Roberts would provide such 
a caveat. Public fora are, by definition, creatures of the govern-
ment. Indeed, they are largely creations of the government. A pub-
lic park could not exist as a public park, unless sufficient govern-
ment regulation could ensure that it is at least minimally 
identifiable, functional, clean, and well-maintained. Most such 
regulations are bound to have an impact on expression—even if it 
is just on the margins. Laws maintaining order and cleanliness or 
determining the location or presence of trees, signage, fountains 
or concrete public squares may affect if and how private expression 
is conveyed in the park. Yet, few would argue that the First 
Amendment precludes the government from making such funda-
mental regulatory interventions. Indeed, most would likely agree 
that it is a critical responsibility of government to make such regu-
latory choices with regard to the public realm.
As discussed, the political party system in America is in many 
ways a constitutional conundrum. And the notion of a public fo-
rum was itself a riddle that took the Court a long time to reconcile. 
Upon reflection, this problem and solution are just waiting to be 
united. The political party system has a surprising amount in 
common with a public park or other public fora. As essential and 
fundamental elements of our electoral system political parties are 
invariably subject to significant government regulation, both for 
practical reasons, such as incorporating party elections into the 
mechanics of the state-run voting apparatus, and normative rea-
sons, such as structuring the electoral process to maximize its core 
democratic attributes. For good or ill, the two major political par-
127. Lamb’s Chapel v. Cent. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 396–97
(1993).
128. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 698 (2010).
129. Hague, 307 U.S. at 516.
130. Id.
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ties are incorporated into the very architecture of American gov-
ernment, from the leadership hierarchy in Congress to the compo-
sition of independent agencies such as the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. At the same time, political parties are among 
the most important vehicles by which individuals join together to 
disseminate, generate, and contest political ideas. To most scholars 
and jurists, political speech pertaining to public issues lies at the 
very heart of the First Amendment.131 Like other public fora, the 
political party system both is government and must be free from gov-
ernment. It is precisely this type of paradox that the public forum 
doctrine was designed to accommodate.
VI. THE MECHANICS OF PUBLIC FORA
The Court has over time articulated a number of types of public 
fora. The public forum concept originated as a reference to public 
places such as “streets and parks,” which by long-standing tradition 
were used for assembly, debate, and general expressive activity.132
These quintessential public fora were eventually joined by another 
category of public forum: the designated forum, or those that were 
open by the government to the public by choice or designation. In 
all of these public fora, “the government may not prohibit all 
communicative activity”133 but “[r]easonable time, place, and man-
ner regulations are permissible, and content-based prohibition 
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state inter-
est.”134 However, the Court has most recently designated a third 
category of public forum, which is “created for a limited purpose 
such as use by certain groups.”135 In a “limited public forum,” the 
First Amendment constraints on government regulation, while still 
significant, are somewhat more permissive. Restrictions on speech 
or barriers to access must simply “be reasonable and viewpoint 
neutral.”136 This Part argues that political parties have the attributes 
of a limited public forum.
131. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011); N.Y. Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 717–24 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 15–16, 24–27 (1948).
132. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
133. Id. at 45.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Id. at 46 n.7.
136. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010).
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It seems relatively clear that political parties would not qualify as 
quintessential public fora, such as a public sidewalk or park. The 
Court has not been willing to expand traditional public forum cat-
egory beyond public thoroughfares and parks. Thus, if the public 
forum doctrine were applied to the political party system, courts 
would have to determine whether political parties should be classi-
fied as either designated public fora with greater First Amendment 
immunity from expression-related regulation, or as limited public 
fora with a somewhat lesser protected status. In Christian Legal Socie-
ty v. Martinez, the Court concluded that a public-university-
sponsored system of official recognition for student groups was a 
limited public forum.137 In a brief footnote, it explained that all 
parties agreed on the system’s categorization as a limited public fo-
rum, which was defined as when “governmental entities [open] 
property ‘limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to 
the discussion of certain subjects.’”138 The public law school at issue 
required that student organizations, in order to receive official sta-
tus, abide by a nondiscrimination policy-interpreted to mandate 
that such groups “accept-all-comers.”139 For the Christian Legal So-
ciety (CLS), this meant that it was faced with a choice: either
change its policy and no longer deny membership to openly gay 
students or forgo registered student organization (RSO) status.140
The analogy to American political parties is hard to ignore. In
countless ways, the government officially sponsors a two-party sys-
tem, which, even more so than in the case of official student 
groups at a public university, serves an essential function that fur-
thers and is incorporated into the institution’s central mission of 
representative government. Comparable to the “benefits [that] at-
tend this school-approved status” as an RSO at a public law school, 
the two major political parties are afforded significant governmen-
tally-endowed benefits that attach to their official status—
including, of course, being integrated into the very structure of 
American democracy and voting procedure. Just like a potential-
RSO, as associations of ideologically, culturally, and socially united 
individuals, political parties are free to exist without the benefits 
that accompany official status. In the case of a political party, if it 
chose not to comply with applicable government regulations, it 
would simply be denied benefits that accompany activity in the 
137. Id. at 679 n.12.
138. Id. at 679 n.11.
139. Id. at 668.
140. Id. at 669.
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public forum, including access to government-administered ballots 
and designated party-based bureaucratic posts. The association 
could continue to exist in a different form; instead of a political 
party, it would simply be identified as an interest group. Finally, 
there is the accept-all-comers non-discrimination requirement that 
any group that meets certain baseline criteria must be permitted to 
be a part of the expressive forum. To qualify as an official RSO, a 
group had to be a noncommercial organization comprised of only 
students at the institution, but it must have nevertheless been open 
to all students. This is analogous to the American two-party system 
in that any American eligible to vote may generally become a 
member of either party simply by registering with that party. The 
Court has prohibited the discriminatory denial of such open 
membership.141
Perhaps the most significant distinguishing attribute of the RSO 
system—when contrasted with the reigning First Amendment par-
adigm applicable to America’s political party system—is that, while 
the Martinez Court readily accepted the claim that both expressive 
association and the public forum doctrine were at play, courts have 
only applied the former to political parties. The Supreme Court 
has failed to entertain the notion that the party system is, in fact, a
type of public forum. Granted, Martinez might be understood as 
addressing two discrete First Amendment questions: first, the abil-
ity to utilize a public forum without discrimination based on belief; 
and second, the ability of an expressive association to control its 
message through control over its membership. However, Martinez 
is an excellent illustration of how distinctions between expressive 
association analysis and public forum analysis invariably break 
down. The Court ultimately acknowledged this convergence in 
Martinez. At first take, in both the RSO and political party contexts, 
it is possible to see two separable and isolatable units of First 
Amendment analysis: first, the Christian Legal Society and Political 
Party as independent expressive associations with their own rights; 
and second, the government-established, -owned, or -controlled 
package of benefits or property that is the public forum. However, 
when the Christian association in Martinez requested that the Court 
“engage each line of cases independently,” the Court said no. In 
the Court’s view, because the two arguments effectively 
“merge[, . . .] limited-public forum precedents supply the appro-
141. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
WINTER 2019] The Political Party System as a Public Forum 471
priate framework for assessing both CLS’s speech and association 
rights.”142
The argument for such a merger is even stronger in the political 
party context, which suggests that it is the public forum doctrine, 
and not expressive association, that should govern any First 
Amendment issues. Once political parties accept the benefits of 
political party status, they become a part of the political party sys-
tem, as it is a limited public forum designed for democracy-
facilitating purposes. As such, under public forum principles, they 
may be regulated within certain bounds. Likewise, the Christian 
Legal Society, once it became a part of the RSO system, may be 
recognized as both a participant in and part of the limited public 
forum. It became an organization that may be regulated within 
First Amendment limits, such that it serves the narrow set of inter-
ests and needs of the public institution. “[W]ithout controversy,”
the organization may be limited by regulation to “comprising only 
students” as members,143 just as the Republican Party may presum-
ably be prohibited by law from allowing seven-year-old political afi-
cionados from registering as party members. Outside of this lim-
ited public forum context, a private expressive association has 
significant constitutional freedom to define or limit its own mem-
bership however it sees fit.144 However, in the context of a merger 
between expressive association and limited public forum, it be-
comes impossible to truly disaggregate the association from the fo-
rum. As the Court explains, “the strict scrutiny we have applied in 
some settings to laws that burden expressive association would, in 
practical effect, invalidate a defining characteristic of limited pub-
lic forums—the State may ‘reserv[e] [them] for certain groups.’”145
Reserving public fora for certain groups and purposes must, as a 
corollary, involve defining with those groups and purposes with 
some specificity. Defining these groups and purposes must mean 
establishing who is in and who is out through a regulatory regime. 
As long as this is achieved in a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral 
way, the limited public forum doctrine suggests that such regula-
tions are consistent with the First Amendment.
The Court employs a carrot versus stick metaphor to justify 
greater First Amendment lenience. Such lenience might arguably 
142. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 680.
143. Id. at 681.
144. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
145. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 681 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
472 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:2
apply to all instances in which expressive association rights are 
claimed in the context of a limited public forum. The Court ex-
plains: “In diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished be-
tween policies that require action and those that withhold bene-
fits. . . . Application of the less restrictive limited-public-forum 
analysis better accounts for the fact that [the public institution], 
through its RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not 
wielding the stick of prohibition.”146 A similar conclusion can be 
drawn with regard to parties since no interest group is compelled 
to become a political party, even though becoming one entitles 
that association to the vast benefit of participating in and becom-
ing an official part of the formal structure of American democra-
cy.” The party system is arguably one hundred percent carrot, justi-
fying the government’s ability to impose reasonable viewpoint-
neutral regulations without violating the First Amendment.147
In instances when public universities engaged in viewpoint dis-
crimination against student groups, the Court concluded that the 
institution’s actions were unconstitutional, which is consistent with 
the limited public forum doctrine.148 Throughout these cases, the 
Court has shown sensitivity to the judiciary’s lack of experience in 
the educational field and the need for judicial restraint, humility, 
and deference. “Cognizant that judges lack on-the-ground exper-
tise and experience of school administrators[,] . . . we have cau-
tioned courts in various contexts to resist ‘substitut[ing] their own 
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school author-
ities which they review.’”149 With such striking parallels to the polit-
ical party system and the efforts of states and localities to impose 
reasonable viewpoint-neutral regulations on political parties, one 
might question why the Court has not relied upon a similar senti-
ment of judicial modesty to guide its political party jurisprudence. 
As Elizabeth Garrett explains, many 
146. Id. at 682–83 (citation omitted).
147. One scholar has argued that because of this, political parties might be viewed under 
the unconstitutional conditions rubric. In other words, states may offer benefits to parties in 
exchange for parties voluntarily accepting a limitation on their own First Amendment rights; 
however, in certain circumstances, such a relinquishment of rights will constitute an uncon-
stitutional condition. See Dimino, supra note 7, at 66–67.
148. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
149. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 686 (quoting Bd. Of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 
(1982)).
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outcomes are often consistent with plausible visions of 
democratic institutions. Thus, to decide political party cas-
es, judges are very likely to rely on their own views of the 
best governance structures for a stable democracy. This 
means that one contested view of the role of political par-
ties is . . . constitutionalized.150
It also means that state innovation may be stymied. As Justice 
Stevens once argued in dissent, “[s]tates should be free to experi-
ment with reforms designed to make the democratic process more 
robust.”151
In 2008, Justice Scalia lamented a Court decision that allowed 
Washington State’s primary law to stand. Washington’s system re-
placed internal party primaries with a top-two primary that includ-
ed the entire field of candidates regardless of party. In Scalia’s dis-
senting view, there was “no state interest behind this law except the 
Washington legislature’s dislike for bright-colors partisanship, and 
its desire to blunt the ability of political parties with noncentrist 
views to endorse and advocate their own candidates.”152 Many re-
spectable thinkers may share Scalia’s apparent distaste for cen-
trism. The virtues or vices of electoral legal structures that discour-
age polarization are worthy of debate. However, this does not 
necessarily make it a constitutional debate. In that case, Scalia was 
troubled because candidates would be able to list their preferred 
party on the ballot without regard to whether the party wished for 
them to do so. But the parallels to Martinez are striking. Just as the 
student organizations were required to accept all comers, Scalia 
was concerned that parties were “compelled to associate with a per-
son whose views the group does not accept.”153 But in a limited 
public forum, a state is permitted to make a policy judgment that 
gives greater weight to a countervailing interest, one that is in 
some ways irreconcilable with this ostensible associational right: 
the expressive interest of the candidate himself to communicate his
party preference. Under the public forum rubric, states would be 
free to structure election laws such that the individuals who are af-
fected by the forum have expressive priority, rather than the par-
ties qua parties.
150. Garrett, supra note 7, at 131.
151. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 601 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 470 (2008) (Scal-
ia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 463.
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In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, the 
Court struck down provisions in the California Elections Code that 
dictated the term of office for party chairs, required the geograph-
ic rotation of such chairs between the northern and southern parts 
of the state, and prohibited party governing bodies from publicly 
endorsing party-primary candidates.154 In rejecting the constitu-
tionality of the ban on pre-primary party endorsements, the Court 
emphasized the right of parties “to select a standard bearer who 
best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”155 It 
claimed that the California regulation “suffocates this right.”156
However, it is really a question of how, rather than if. The Court’s
current case law suggests that this choice of a standard bearer is a 
form of associational speech. However, there are limitless possible 
procedures for choosing such a standard bearer. Different proce-
dures have differing implications for different party members, and 
they may very well result in different “speech.” The “speech” of the 
association is in significant part determined by the procedures 
used to determine what the speech shall be. Some procedures may 
benefit the party elites, giving their views relatively more weight in 
determining what will ultimately be “spoken” by the party. Other 
procedures may have the opposite effect, placing a thumb on the 
scale for everyday rank-and-file party members.
To California legislators representing the people of the state, 
the best procedure for determining the party voice regarding its
standard bearer was a primary vote by party members, without the 
influence of a pre-vote endorsement. The Court remained uncon-
vinced, proclaiming its doubt “that the silencing of official party 
committees, alone among various groups interested in the out-
come of a primary election, is key to protecting voters from confu-
sion. . . . The State makes no showing, moreover, that voters are 
unduly influenced by party endorsements.”157 But why should the 
state have to convince the Court that its policy choices are optimal? 
Is it not the role of the state government to seek to improve upon 
its democratic process through trial and error, particularly where 
the entity being regulated has been incorporated by law into this 
process? By granting partial constitutional immunity to the two 
parties that effectively monopolize America’s political system, the 
154. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989).
155. Id. at 224.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 228 n.18.
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Court diluted a democratic check on the process by which these 
parties go about their democratically-essential work.
If, however, we do away with the misguided characterization of 
parties as rights-bearing associations and replace it with a public 
forum formulation, the outcome begins to look much more sensi-
ble. As Martinez demonstrates, opening a limited public forum in-
variably involves establishing reasonable standards for participation 
through regulation. Yet government regulation would remain con-
strained in important ways. The state of California could not, for 
example, make viewpoint-based distinctions as to what type of 
standard-bearers may or may not be endorsed by a political party. 
Because this would not be considered government speech, the 
State could not selectively prohibit only endorsements of racist 
candidates, anti-Catholic bigots, or candidates that are not mem-
bers of unions.158 It could, however, decide on reasonable rules to 
structure the forum so that it best achieves its public purpose.
If a state or locality opts to remove a large and obtrusive stage in 
the middle of a public park and replace it with a number of dis-
crete areas in which smaller groups of people may gather and in-
teract, few would assert that this constitutes a First Amendment vio-
lation. Landscape design necessitates choice, and a governmental 
authority might reasonably prefer a design that encourages a 
greater diversity of smaller scale expressive activity, as opposed to a 
design that accommodates only a single speaker who will likely 
dominate the entire public forum. Both are respectable choices, 
whether as a single stage directing all attention to one or two voic-
es or a greater number of smaller venues encouraging a plurality of 
voices. The government’s role under the public forum doctrine is 
to manage scarce public resources by making informed choices 
about how they should be best structured, whether that govern-
ment has only two major public parks in a small city or two major 
political parties in a large country. The two major political parties 
have become a fixture of our political system, and the system has 
solidified over a century and a half because of a range of social 
forces but also, in large part, by explicit government action. The
two parties are central to the functioning of American democracy. 
They are scarce resources, and as such, regulatory choice is a ne-
cessity.
158. See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
476 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:2
VII. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE FIT: SOME ILLUSTRATIONS
In American jurisprudence, constitutional doctrine evolves on a 
case-by-case basis. Like the common law system more generally, 
this process has many strengths. It allows constitutional change to 
occur incrementally, as the Court is confronted with new challeng-
es that test the meaning of constitutional precepts in unanticipated 
ways. Thus, at the time of the White Primary Cases, it became clear 
that vital constitutional interests justified treating ostensibly inde-
pendent political parties as state actors subject to the commands of 
the Civil War Amendments. As freedom of association evolved as a 
distinctive constitutional right in other contexts, however, the 
Court came to treat political parties in a very different manner, as 
independent entities that are entitled to autonomy from govern-
ment. As discussed, these two conceptions of the political party are 
in clear tension with one another. When we pull back, the doctri-
nal “big picture” becomes messy. And indeed, perhaps it is an ex-
cellent illustration of how the natural process of case-by-case con-
stitutional evolution, by focusing on each tree one at a time, can 
sometimes harvest a rather ugly forest. We end up stuck on a juris-
prudential path that is not ideal; here, this course requires courts 
to treat political parties as two contradictory things at once.
To take one example, in the 1986 case Tashjian v. Republican Par-
ty of Connecticut, the Court struck down as unconstitutional Con-
necticut’s closed primary law, under which the Republican Party 
would have been barred, against its wishes, from allowing inde-
pendents to vote in its primary.159 The majority effectively conced-
ed that it faced what appeared to be two conflicting constitutional 
commands. It agreed that under Article I, Section 4, clause 1, “the 
Constitution grants the States a broad power to proscribe the 
‘Time, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives.”160 Looking back to Classic and Allwright, the Court 
explained that “‘[w]here the state law has made the primary an in-
tegral part of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary 
effectively controls the choice,’ the requirements of Article [I, Sec-
tion 2], clause 1, and the Seventeenth Amendment apply to prima-
ries as well as to general elections.”161 Accordingly, on one hand, 
given the fact that the government is responsible for establishing 
and regulating the ballot box (and party primary voting is a large 
159. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
160. Id. at 217.
161. Id. at 227.
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part of this responsibility), “party action” would appear to be “state 
action.” On the other hand, however, the Court tells us that, under 
the First Amendment, party members have a right to freely associ-
ate “with like-minded citizens,” and that any “interference with the 
freedom of a party” intrudes on this individual right.162
There are a number of ways to manage this fundamental con-
tradiction. One possibility is to break political parties down into 
discrete, bite-sized components. Case by case, particular action by 
political parties will be determined either to be state action subject 
to complete regulatory control by the government or a type of par-
ty behavior that is purely private. The former would be considered 
“government speech,” and because the government would be 
speaking, the First Amendment would put no limits on the types of 
regulations imposed. The latter category of action, however, would 
receive full associational protection because it involves a private 
expressive entity. Such an approach would ostensibly have the 
benefit of clarity when it comes to constitutional results: either 
there exists a fully protected expressive association under the First 
Amendment or a government speaker that can regulate itself how-
ever it sees fit. Yet, aside from the jurisprudential whiplash that 
might occur from such bipolar doctrinal treatment, a court may 
struggle to draw the line between instances when a political party 
acts as the government and when the party acts as an autonomous 
independent association; indeed, there is little evidence that the 
Court has sought to use a doctrinal scalpel to dissect and catego-
rize party attributes in this manner. There is a good reason for this, 
as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to do. A group of individ-
ual Republicans who get together to discuss policy ideas might 
claim to be in the “full associational freedom” category, but what if 
those individuals are members of the House Republican Caucus? 
Would the House of Representatives be prohibited by the First 
Amendment from regulating itself, from structuring congressional 
expression through parliamentary procedure?
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Court took a dif-
ferent approach. According to the methodology above, one might 
place the administration of a primary election firmly in the “state 
action” category. After all, elections are managed, directed, and 
paid for by the state government. However, instead of such a black 
or white “litmus-paper test,” the Court articulated a rule that bal-
anced the constitutional benefits with the constitutional burdens 
162. Id. at 215.
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in every case. A “[c]ourt must not only determine the legitimacy 
and strength of each of [the state’s and the political party’s] inter-
ests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make 
it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”163 Connecticut provid-
ed a number of reasons for why it sought to disallow independents 
from voting in party primaries: “ensuring the administrability of 
the primary system, preventing raiding, avoiding voter confusion, 
and protecting the responsibility of party government.”164 To the 
party, such a regulation burdened “the right of its members to de-
termine for themselves with whom they will associate, as well as 
whose support they will seek, in their quest for political success.”165
In every case, under the rule articulated in Tashjian, it becomes the 
role of the Court to declare who wins and, in the process, to effec-
tively decide what is, and what is not, good policy—and good for 
democracy. The Court’s repeated rejection of a “litmus-paper 
test”166 has meant that small differences in how a state chooses to 
regulate political parties can have profound repercussions. These 
repercussions are difficult to justify on consistent and principled 
constitutional grounds when one pulls back and looks at the 
broader body of political party jurisprudence.
For example, while Connecticut was denied the ability to restrict 
who may vote in party primaries in its state, the Court in 2005 al-
lowed Oklahoma to impose a similar restriction.167 The only differ-
ence was that the Oklahoma law imposed “semiclosed” rather than 
“closed” primaries. This meant that instead of being prohibited 
from allowing independents and members of other parties from 
voting in their primaries, only the latter were precluded.168 Such a 
distinction might seem relatively inconsequential from the stand-
point of the Constitution, but not to the Court in Clingman v. Bea-
ver. Very much unlike its resolution in Tashjian, the Court was 
“persuaded that any burden Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary im-
poses [on parties] is minor and justified by legitimate state inter-
ests.”169
To assess the extent of a “burden,” of course, there must pre-
sumably be some baseline agreement as to the nature of the inter-
est being burdened. The members of the Clingman Court could 
163. Id. at 214.
164. Id. at 217.
165. Id. at 214.
166. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (1997).
167. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 584 (2005).
168. Id. at 587.
169. Id.
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only muster a plurality for this part of its opinion, which further il-
lustrates the inherent difficulty of establishing a principled doc-
trine of associational rights for political parties. The plurality effec-
tively suggested that an individual has little to no associational 
interest in voting in another party’s primary if that voter is unwill-
ing to disassociate from his current party.170 O’Connor and Breyer, 
although joining the holding, adamantly disagreed, concluding 
that voting in a party primary is typically the key reason individuals 
choose to associate with political parties in the first place. Indeed, 
in the realm of political parties, voting may be said to be the most 
critical way of associating.171 The act of party registration may in 
fact be a much less significant so-called act of association.172 To 
many, it may simply represent a minor bureaucratic hurdle, a pre-
requisite to the main associational event: voting for a particular 
party’s candidate. In fact, to many Americans, registering with one 
of the major political parties may not be conceived of as associa-
tion at all, but rather a simple means to an end to ensure meaning-
ful access to democratic participation.
Furthermore, even if we assume that there is an associational in-
terest in one’s mere registration as a party member, as O’Connor 
most reasonably pointed out, there is little reason to conclude that 
associating with one group would somehow negate the concomi-
tant interest in associating with other groups at the same time. This 
is particularly true in a political system with institutionalized two-
party dominance, as the size and staggering diversity of the Ameri-
can electorate virtually ensures that few, if any, Americans will be a 
precise fit, ideologically and culturally, with one of the two major 
political camps. As O’Connor opined, “[w]e surely would not say, 
for instance, that a registered Republican or Democrat has no pro-
tected interest in associating with the Libertarian Party by attend-
ing meetings or making political contributions.”173 In sum, the 
Court is in discord, not merely over how it should balance the stat-
ed regulatory interests of the government against the burdens im-
posed on the political parties and voters involved, but on the very 
nature or existence of associational interests in the first place.
Through a long series of inconsistent decisions, the Court has 
ultimately framed the issue of political party regulation as a matter 
involving a balancing of directly conflicting constitutional interests. 
170. Id. at 588–89.
171. See id. at 598–99 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 600–01.
173. Id. at 601.
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The frame utilized by the Court has meant that nebulous and diffi-
cult-to-define First Amendment associational interests are repeat-
edly pitted against the electoral regulatory interests clearly 
acknowledged in Article I. The Court has forced itself into a cor-
ner, where it has no choice but to resolve complex factual and con-
text-specific matters involving questions of political theory about
which even political scientists and other experts sharply disagree.
Treating political parties as part of a public forum, however, 
would largely avoid this conundrum. If the political party system is 
reimagined as a type of public forum, the Constitution would no 
longer be at odds with itself. Granted, the Constitution’s text does 
not explicitly allocate power to states and the federal government 
to regulate political parties in Article I, Section 2, clause 1 and Ar-
ticle I, Section 4, clause 1, or provide for the freedom of political 
parties to be free from government regulation as expressive associa-
tions under the First Amendment. The internal constitutional con-
flict that currently exists was a product of precedents that derived 
implicit meaning from those provisions, thus extending their cov-
erage to political parties through such readings. Nonetheless, re-
framing the issue as a public forum question would not merely 
eliminate this constitutional contradiction; rather, it would actively 
promote the constitutional values in both Article I and the First 
Amendment. Consistent with the White Primary Cases, a law affect-
ing the political party system would fulfill the government’s explicit 
responsibility to “[r]egulat[e]” under Article I, Section 4, clause 1 
“[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives.”174 At the same time, as public forums, gov-
ernment regulations would not be permitted to “abridg[e] the 
freedom of speech”175 of political parties in a viewpoint-based or 
unreasonable manner. A robust body of jurisprudence has devel-
oped around the public forum doctrine, which would help ensure 
that the government does not abuse its power to regulate these vi-
tal outlets for political and ideological contestation. Although po-
litical parties are unique and complex institutions—certainly dis-
tinct from other public fora confronted by the Court in the past—
principles derived from many decades of public forum case law of-
fer guidance as to where the boundary lies between facilitation of 
the electoral process and the abridgment of speech.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1
175. U.S. CONST. amend. I
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The endorsement ban struck down in Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Central Committee, discussed above, provides an illustra-
tion. The Court’s take on the California law that prohibited parties 
from endorsing candidates prior to a primary was far from subtle: 
it agreed with the Court of Appeals that the regulation constituted 
an “‘outright ban’ on political speech.”176 Such a law “patently in-
fringes [on] the right of the party to express itself.”177 It “directly 
hampers the ability of a party to spread its message,” is “highly pa-
ternalistic,” and is “particularly egregious [in that] the State cen-
sors the political speech a political party shares with its mem-
bers.”178 All of these characterizations, of course, are premised on 
the assumption that a political party, as an association, is an auton-
omous rights-bearing entity that should be treated as the equiva-
lent of an individual who asserts his or her freedom of speech. Had 
the Court instead reached back to the White Primary Cases and
characterized the party as a state actor, the conclusion would have 
been the precise opposite. As government speech, it would be well 
within the state’s discretion to declare that parties will refrain from 
expressing a preference for a particular candidate prior to the ac-
tual primary vote, just as it was for the federal government to bar 
speech about abortion as a lawful option when spoken by health 
care providers whose services fall under the auspices of a govern-
ment funded program.179
However, if instead of associational speech or government 
speech, the political party system in California were to be consid-
ered a limited public forum, the Court would be tasked with de-
termining whether this prohibition on pre-primary party endorse-
ments fits into the constitutional sweet spot: a reasonable 
regulation that does not abridge free speech on the basis of a 
speaker’s viewpoint. Is this a regulation comparable to a city ordi-
nance that limits a particular public theater’s stage capacity to x 
people? In such a case, a speaker might want to use that theater to 
express herself at a particular time, but she may be barred by the 
regulation from doing so because this would bring its occupancy to 
x + 1. A public theater can accommodate only so many people be-
fore the ability to safely and effectively use it for expression and 
other purposes begins to diminish appreciably.180 Certainly, the 
176. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 221 (1989).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 223–24.
179. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–78 (1991).
180. See Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 554–55 (1975).
482 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:2
government must also determine a fair way of allocating its use, 
which presumes that only one theatrical production may occur at a 
time and that time is finite. Such regulations clearly limit expres-
sion. But as the Court has held, because a public theater is a public 
forum, it would not become a First Amendment abridgement un-
less choices are made without “procedural safeguards that reduce 
the danger of suppressing constitutionally protected speech.”181
However, one might respond that a public theater is a poor 
analogy for a political party in that a public theater, by its nature, 
provides opportunity for finite expressive use and can facilitate on-
ly so many voices over the course of a year, located within a con-
strained space that can fit only so many listeners. However, a polit-
ical party faces similar constraints. Once a party officially endorses 
one candidate among many in its primary, it has fundamentally al-
tered itself as a forum. There are only two major parties, and one 
of two now functions differently. Like tearing out all of the seats 
from a public theater to facilitate its use as a mosh pit, the nature 
of the forum is transformed. Just as that theater without seats will 
be less useful as an opera house and more appropriate for rock 
concerts, that political party with an official endorsement will pre-
sumably serve less effectively as an open forum for broadly and ev-
enhandedly weighing the merits of candidates within a certain ide-
ological range, and it will perhaps function more effectively as an 
organization advocating a narrower vision, less amenable to a wide 
range of viewpoints. It cannot be both of these things at once. Un-
der the public forum doctrine, a government’s choice to adopt one 
structure over the other would likely not in itself present a First 
Amendment issue, as long as it is procedurally fair and not a form 
of viewpoint-based discrimination. The Court has famously held 
that a constitutional violation occurred where a city, without such 
procedures, denied a production company the opportunity to use 
a public theater to perform the controversial musical Hair.182
If political parties were treated as public forums, the Court in Eu
would not have been in the awkward position of playing political 
scientist. Granted, utilizing the public forum doctrine comes with 
its own set of challenges. Over time, courts would flesh out the dis-
tinctions between permissible regulations on political parties, those 
that are reasonable and non-viewpoint based according to the lim-
ited public forum test, and regulations that violate this rule. How-
181. Id. at 555–59.
182. See id. at 562.
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ever, courts are arguably much better equipped to make First 
Amendment distinctions, such as whether speech regulation is 
viewpoint-based or content-based and whether such regulation is 
minimally “reasonable,” than they are to make fine-grained policy 
assessments of the merits or demerits of a wide range of highly-
debatable electoral policies implemented by states and the federal 
government.
With the limited public forum framework, the Court would not 
have been tasked with determining whether or not California cor-
rectly asserted that promoting “stable government and protecting 
voters from confusion and undue influence” constituted a “com-
pelling government interest”183 that justified a ban on pre-primary 
party endorsements. Instead, the Court would have considered 
how this prohibition fit with the purpose and traditional use of the 
public forum. Like a board’s decision to reject a production of 
Hair at a municipal theater, it is possible that a prohibition on en-
dorsements might be characterized as a prior restraint.184 However, 
if the party system is understood as a limited public forum and the 
restriction is applied using a fair and non-discriminatory proce-
dure that is applied in the same manner to all major parties, it 
would likely pass constitutional muster. Unlike with a government 
speech regime, the state could not simply pick and choose which 
endorsements to allow or disallow in order to promote particular 
ideological or policy objectives. And unlike the associational 
speech framework, a political party made up of millions of diverse 
individuals would not be reified and treated as if it had a single 
First Amendment voice. Instead, political parties would receive 
First Amendment treatment sensitive to their status as hybrid enti-
ties that are neither fully governmental nor solely private.
CONCLUSION
Election law structures the process by which diverse ideas com-
pete in America’s democratic marketplace. The First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech is clearly relevant to this endeavor, and it 
should not be ignored as state and federal governments regulate 
America’s electoral system. The free exchange of ideas allows for 
the drawing of ideological contrasts and for translating these dif-
183. Eu, 489 U.S. at 226.
184. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 554.
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ferences into competitive electoral contests with tangible conse-
quences, as elected leaders implement particular policy choices 
and decisively reject others. Yet, there is a vast array of ways to 
structure the electoral process in America. It is critical that the 
First Amendment is not used to unreasonably impede the im-
portant work election law plays in keeping representative govern-
ment strong. The First Amendment should allow for innovative 
and diverse approaches to election administration, tailored to a va-
riety of needs and concerns, by a variety of jurisdictions. Yes, vigor-
ous and expansive First Amendment doctrine can enlarge and 
strengthen the opportunities for democratic participation. Less of-
ten acknowledged, however, is the fact that similarly vigorous and 
expansive First Amendment doctrine may have the very opposite 
outcome if improperly applied.
Outside of broad constitutional parameters, the Founding gen-
eration did not dictate the fine-grained details of how America’s
electoral system should operate. They embedded flexibility into 
election law by explicitly not constitutionalizing core issues—
commanding, for example, that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner 
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be pre-
scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”185 America’s elec-
toral process has taken shape over two centuries through conscious 
choice, trial and error, evolving social norms, inertia, and a com-
bination of many other factors. When the Court adopts the consti-
tutional view that political parties should be treated as rights-
bearing expressive associations, it risks rigidifying structural com-
ponents of American election law that should remain flexible. At 
the same time, because the Court is not blind to the reality that po-
litical parties are intimately intertwined with government, attempts 
at consistent and principled doctrinal categorization have inevita-
bly devolved into an unsatisfying and unpredictable form of ad hoc
balancing. Such jurisprudence denies governments the freedom to 
innovate and adapt that the Framers built into the American elec-
toral system. It also instills great uncertainty into governmental ef-
forts to improve upon election law. When political parties are per-
ceived as expressive associations, it becomes the role of the Court, 
which is made up of justices with a range of views on the democrat-
ic “good,” to declare just what kind of party system is optimal. Not 
only does this take the choice of election law procedure out of the 
hands of the people’s democratically elected leaders, and instead 
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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put those decisions in the hands of unelected judges, many would 
agree that judges are simply ill-equipped to fulfill this role.
There is a better way. The ad hoc expressive association analysis 
the Court currently uses to test the constitutional soundness of po-
litical party regulations should be replaced by a public forum anal-
ysis. The public forum doctrine better accommodates the conun-
drum of political parties. Major political parties are both critical 
vehicles for private speech and creatures of government. Govern-
ments could subject the political party system to reasonable, view-
point-neutral regulations, without fear that a court’s ad hoc bal-
ance will result in invalidation. At the same time, political parties’
First Amendment right to retain their ideological commitments, 
without fear of viewpoint discrimination, would be preserved. As 
the Founding Fathers certainly understood, democracy demands 
freedom, but such freedom must be structured by rules. Freedom 
without rules would result in anarchy; rules without freedom, tyr-
anny. The public forum doctrine provides the right balance.

